This paper investigates the capital structure choices for a sample of 19,752 unlisted firms for the period 1994-2004 using a rich data set of unlisted Western European firms.
Introduction
Can the existing knowledge regarding the determinants of firm's capital structure choices with frictions such as tax advantage of debt, bankruptcy, agency/asymmetric information and institutional charateristics of national financial systems be used to describe the SMEs behaviour? Or are these firms so different that we have to build a new theory to be applied to them?
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller [1958] several authors have attempted to explain the determinants of firm's capital structure choices in a national and international sceneries introducing the mentioned frictions. However the ongoing research regarding capital structure financing choices derives from large listed firms and very little it is known about the relative importance of equity, debt and inter-financing for SMEs, especially in an international setting. These firms differs from large listed ones regarding agency and asymmetric information problems and this gives rise to different finance sources for small-medium sized and to large listed firms.
1 An international setting study regarding small-medium sized firms is much more important then those carried out for large listed firms. SMEs tend to operate locally and are financed by local financial institutions while large listed firms are often partly financed by international financial markets being not clear whether the use of large firms samples across countries is a good test for the factors determinining the capital structure.
Most of the research comes from single country analysis. However there are some few studies who focus on international samples to test capital structure models as it is the case of Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Wald (1999) , Booth et al (2001) and more recently Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Gaud et al (2005) . However all of these studies focus on large listed firms. In Rajan and Zingales (1995) the sample was from large listed firms for the G7 countries. They found that the determinants of capital structure in US are the same for the other countries. They also find that debt levels do not differ among bank-oriented countries and market-oriented ones. Wald (1999) , with a sample for G5 countries find that the mean leverage among countries appear to be similar. However he highlights that some of the differences can occur because of the differences in tax policies, agency problems, information asymmetries and shareholder/creditors conflits. Booth et al (2001) , find for 10 developing countries that capital structure choices are affected by the same variables as in developed countries. Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) , using the same sample as Rajan and Zingales (1995) but with more recent data found that the overall leverage in 2001 is lower than in 1991 and the determinants of capital structure in US lose some of the explanatory power overseas.
Finally and more recently Gaud et al (2005) using a sample of listed provide evidence that neither the trade-off or pecking order model offer a suitable description of the capital structure policies in Europe. They also document that the national environment do matter for capital structure decisions.
In this paper a traditional trade-off model in the form of a target adjustment model is estimated for a sample of 19,752 unlisted european firms from sixteen countries in the period 1994 to 2004 (155,401 firm-year observations). According to this model the objective of the firm is to find an optimal capital structure where the marginal benefits from debt shall be equal to their marginal costs.
This paper as three main objectives: First to test the impact of the debt tax shield on the capital structure choices for unlisted SMEs. Second to test whether the same factors determining the capital structure of large listed firms also apply for smallmedium sized firms. Third, if institutional factors such as country legal system have an important impact on firm's capital structure.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the data sources, sample selection and financial information are presented. In section 3 the target adjustment model used to test for tax effects and the variables used in the empirical analysis are discussed. The empirical analysis results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
Data Sources, Sample Selection and Financial information

Data Sources and Sample Selection
The primary financial data is from the 2004 version of Amadeus (Analyse Major
Database from European Sources) database by Bureau Van Dijk. Amadeus is a comprehensive pan-European database containing financial information on 7 million both public and private firms in 38 European countries combining data from 35 information providers (IPs). The information is provided in a comparable and uniform format for realistic cross-border searching and analysis. The format comprises 23 balance sheet items, 25 profit and loss account items and 26 standard ratios. Amadeus is a modular product being possible to choose the level of coverage required -the top 250,000 firms, the top 1.5 million or all firms. In this study the top 250,000 firms is The economic data is from Datastream database which contains a vast number of economic data. The data series are supplied by various sources such as IMF, OECD and EUROSTAT amongst others. Information on stocks and bonds is often supplied by national stock exchanges, interest rates might be supplied by larger banks and exchange rate information often comes from national sources or news agencies like WM/Reuters.
[PLEASE insert Table 1 here] Table 1 shows the number of firms of the sixteen countries with the successive steps presented in 8 different columns. The first column presents the total number of firms that Amadeus database provides to these countries without any restriction (187,365 firms). In column 2 only the firms that belongs to the manufacturing sector were included. I follow the NACE Rev. 1.1, a 2 to 4 digit activity code developed by the European Union (codes 1500 to 3799). The number of firms was reduced to one fourth.
The largest reductions were of Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands with the exclusion of more than 85 percent of the firms. On the opposite side there are countries such as Austria, Germany and Greece with a loss less than 70 percent. Firms with less than 25 employees (column 3) in the last year of firm's available information were also excluded. For the firms with no available information Amadeus estimates automatically the number of employees using the known turnover and total assets from firms of the same sector and country. Belgium and Norway were the countries with the highest reduction in the number of firms (more than 10 percent). In the next step (column 4) I accounts are included since for those who provide only consolidated accounts it is not possible to identify the country effect because those firms even if they are settle down in a specific country the accounts reflect their business in a multiplicity of countries. With this step the total number of firms was reduced to 24,071. Listed firms were also excluded, because the paper focus is unlisted firms. The overall impact was very low with a total reduction of only 247 firms (column 6). Finally in column 7 I exclude the firms: 1) with few available financial information (not enough to construct the variables), 2) with less than 4 complete continuos years of observations (required for estimation purposes), 3) with less than one million euros (or equivalent) in total assets, 4) where total assets it is not equal to current liabilities plus non current liabilities plus shareholder's funds (difference allowed 10,000 euros) and 5) the firm year observations in the most extreme one percent value in either tail of the dependent variable distribution are also removed. The final sample consists of 19,752 firms and 155,401 firm year observations.
[PLEASE insert Table 2 here]
In Table 2 Table 3 reports the structure of panel data showing the number of firm-year observations by country.
Micro Financial Information
[PLEASE insert Table 3 here] To reduce survival bias, firms are allowed to leave and enter the dataset over time. Therefore, the panel data set is unbalanced as there are more observations for some firms than for others. On average the sample supplies close to 8 years of continuous observations by firm. Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and United
Kingdom have an average higher than the whole sample. Austria, Denmark and Germany are on the opposite side with an average below 6 firm year continuous observations. The reasons are different. For Austria and Germany there are few firms with the necessary available financial information to construct the variables used in this study and also some of them have missing years. In the case of Denmark, the Danish legislation do not allow firms to provide more than 5 years of on-line information. [PLEASE insert Table 4 here] for a sample of 10,000 UK small-medium sized firms that trade credit is probably the most fundamental element of small firm financial management system being trade credits equivalent to 11% of total assets.
As written in the previous section few work as been done in an international setting to test capital structure models for large listed firms. Rajan and Zingales [1995] and Aggarwal an Jamdee [2003] are two important exceptions. These papers analyse capital structure choices across G7 countries (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, Italy On the liability side of the balance sheet unlisted firms on average for the countries analysed have significantly less equity. Another important difference is that unlisted firms rely more on trade credit than listed counterparts. That is not a surprise given that listed firms have access to the stock exchange and therefore different financing sources. 
Macroeconomic Information
Model, Variables Specification and Statistics Analysis
Model
The basic empirical model is a static trade-off model in the form of a target adjustment model. As discussed previously debt has benefits in terms of a tax shield.
The disadvantages of debt include the potential bankruptcy costs as point out by Kraus and Litzenberger [1973] and Kim [1978] and the agency costs between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling [1976] ; Myers [1977] ) 4 . The optimal or target capital structure is determined by the equality of marginal benefits with marginal costs. Myers [1984] argued that the trade-off approach implied that the rate of firm's indebtedness reverts to a optimal level, or target. Due to various transactions costs Taggart [1977] and Jalilvand and Harris [1984] suggest that managers adjust the current capital structure towards the optimal structure over time. In a perfect world, without transaction and adjustment costs, firms would automatically adjust debt levels in response to any variation of their objective. Thus changes in the current debt ratio, defined as debt over total assets, is given by a partial adjustment to the deviations of the current ratio from the target:
where, D it is the first difference of debt level for firm i at time t,  the target adjustment coefficient with 0 <  < 1 indicating positive adjustment costs, D * i t is the target debt level for firm i at time t and e it represents random shocks to the current capital structure. A value of  equal to one indicates that firm's adjust automatically the real debt to the objective. As more the value of  is close to one more rapid is the adjustment of the current capital structure towards the target or optimal capital structure.
The target or optimal capital structure is determined by the marginal benefits and costs of debt financing. Few of these benefits and costs can be measured directly and it is therefore necessary to use a set of proxies related to corporate taxe rates, bankruptcy costs, agency/asymmetric information, corporate governance/ownership structure types and macroeconomic factors. The (unobserved) target level for firm i at time t it is given by:
where, D * it is the (unobserved) target debt level for firm i at time t,  is intercept term, TAX it is a set of tax variables for firm i at time t, BANK i t is a vector of bankruptcy variables such as tangible assets and size, AGEN i t is a vector of agency/ asymmetric information variables which includes intangible assets, profitability, firm growth and years of incorporation, GOV i t is a vector of governance variables like firm independence, family versus no family firms and ultimate owner, MACRO t is a vector of macroeconomic factors by year and country such as inflation, short and long term interest rate, growth in GDP and interest rate spread, COUNT i t is a dummy variable representing the different countries and IND i t is a dummy variable for the industry types. These variables representing taxation, bankruptcy costs, agency/asymmetric information, ownership structure and macroeconomic factors, have been some of them identified and used by Graham [1996] , Rajan and Zingales [1995] , Frank and Goyal [2005] , among others. Substituting the equation (2) into (1) yields:
Equation (3) can be estimated as a "linear model". The parameters, γβ, are estimated jointly but the value of β can be retrieved by dividing by one minus the parameter estimate in front of the lagged dependent variable.
Variables Specification and univariate statistics analysis
In this sub-section the chosen variables (dependent and explanatory) and their statistical analysis (mean, standard deviation, etc) are presented. The aim is to have a group of variables that can explain capital structure determinants controlling for both firm-specific and institutional factors. The choice between debt and equity will depend in considerations regarding corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency/asymmetric information, ownership structure and macroeconomic factors and the specificity of each country and industries.
Measuring Debt
Private firms and specially SMEs main financing sources are bank loans, trade credit and internally generated equity (retained earnings). The measure of short term debt and long term debt has some problems because firms may roll over short-term debt and use it for long term financing due to lower rates for the purpose of more flexibility.
This suggests that some of the times short-term debt is therefore in practice long-term debt. One suggestion could be using the sum of short and long term debt. However some part of short-term debt has probably nothing to do with capital structure decisions and its amount is determined by working capital requirements. Scholes and Wolfson [1988 p.170 ] pointed out to the potential importance of short-term debt. According to them firms facing uncertainly in their tax status might prefer to use short-term debt when their tax rate is high. Therefore, short-term debt will be less costly and the easy way to adjust debt levels temporarily towards firm's optimum. Some of the studies have excluded short term debt on their leverage calculation. That is the case of Bradley, Jarrel and Kim [1984] , Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig [1992] and Graham [1996] among others.
In this paper the debt measure is calculated as long term debt plus short term debt plus creditors minus debtors plus other current liabilities. This is an attempt to both include short term debt and to remove the impact of working capital requirements.
[PLEASE insert Table 6 here] than the large firms (76.83%). So, in both long and short term debt large firms use it more often than small firms. In the case of trade credit, 94.63% of firm year observations report the use of this financing source which highlight the importance of creditors as a financing source. Thre is not a clear distinction in this case among large and small firms.
[PLEASE insert Table 7 here]
On and 31.51%, respectively).
The Impact of Taxes
Several tax variables are used to capture different aspects of the relation among taxes and firm's leverage such as: the effect of firm's negative earnings, non-debt tax shields, tax loss carry-forwards, change in statutory tax rate and a measure to capture whether firms use debt conservatively or aggressively i.e. if firms use debt to minimize taxes. Next the tax variables are presented in more detail.
a) Tax Dummy
One of the tax variables that have been more commonly used to measure of tax status in the literature is a dummy variable with a value equal to one if earnings after taxes (EAT) are negative and zero otherwise. If EAT is negative then the tax shield from increasing the amount of debt is smaller than for firms with positive EAT. Given that this variable proxies, for firms financing decisions after negative EAT, the variable is defined lagged one period (one year). This variable only captures the effect on debt levels of firms with positive earnings versus the ones with negative. Another approach can be made using the value of the statutory tax rate by country in each year when the firm's earnings are positive (instead of one) and zero when the earnings are negative.
This measure captures both the statutory tax rate variation among countries, years and the difference between firms. A final approach can be made taking in account the value of tax loss-carry forwards. This variable is equal to the top statutory tax rate if the firm has positive earnings equal to one half of this tax if either the taxable income is positive and there are tax loss carry-forwards from previous years or the firm has negative earnings but there are no tax-loss-carry forwards and zero otherwise. This last measure captures the statutory tax rate changes among countries and both the effect of negative earnings and tax loss carry forwards from previous years 5 . For the first approach a negative relation with debt levels is expected while for the second and third approaches a positive relation one. These differences may depend from the region where the firm is located and the sector.
b) Statutory Tax Rate
However even with these shortcomings and given that the statutory tax rate had decreased for almost all the countries in the sample period, a decrease in debt levels is expected since with a decrease in the statutory tax rate the tax shield of debt will be less attractive to the firms. Bartholdy [1989] have used this variable before and a positive relation between this variable and debt levels is expected.
[PLEASE insert Table 8 here] 
c) NDTS -non-debt tax shields
DeAngelo and Masulis [1980] argue that firm's non-debt tax shields should be negatively related to firm debt. The intuition behind this statement is if a firm has a large amount of non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and investment tax credits, the probability of having negative taxable income is higher. Therefore if a firm has a large amout of non-debt tax shields then it is less likely that the firm will increase the amount of debt for tax reasons. Following this argument it is expected that debt levels are inversely related to the level of non-debt tax shields. However, firms with large amounts of depreciation are probably firms with historically good investment opportunities and profitable operations. If these firms used debt to finance their new investments it is possible that a spurious relation between debt levels and depreciation exists, this is unrelated to tax shield issues. In this line Mackie- Mason [1990] argued that the negative relation with debt levels holds only for firms which are more likely to be close to tax exhaustion. Therefore two different approaches are made to proxy nondebt tax shields: total depreciation over total assets and then interaction of total depreciation divided by total assets and a dummy variable equal to one if Cash Flow is negative in the previous year and zero otherwise. Nevertheless, a negative relation with debt levels in both approaches is expected. This negative relation can also occur because small firms are financed predominantly with internal generated equity (retained earnings).
d) Kink
This variable is adapted from Graham [2000] and measures whether firms use debt conservatively or aggressively i.e. if firms use debt to minimize taxes. An aggressive firm with positive earnings before interest and taxes would issue just enough debt to ensure that earnings after interest but before tax is zero, whereas a conservative firm would issue less debt and therefore face positive taxes. Firms with positive earnings after interest payments could increase their level of debt and interest payments and achieve a marginal tax benefit which is equal to the statutory tax rate. For firms with negative earnings after interest payments, the marginal benefits of increasing debt are smaller than the statutory tax rate. To measure these effects a variable labeled kink is defined as the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes (equal to the amount of interest payments required to make earnings equal to zero) and actual interest paid. If kink is less than one then earnings before tax are less than the actual interest paid and earnings after interest are therefore negative. This represents an aggressive debt policy, whereas if kink is above one then earnings after interest are positive and the firm uses debt more conservatively. Thus conservatism and kink is positively related, and kink is negatively related with debt levels.
e) Effective Tax Rate
This variable is calculated as corporate taxes paid over earnings before taxes. As for the statutory rate a positive relation with debt levels is expected. However since this variable do not capture the dynamics of taxation this could bias the results. As an example a firm can pay a small amount of taxes even though it has large profits due a negative earnings in the previous years (tax loss carry-forwards). So it can be found lower tax bill with high debt levels which could bias the results. Booth et al [1999] as made a different approach calculating an average tax rate on both earnings before and earnings after taxes. They argued that this measure has the advantage to include the impact of tax-loss carryforwards and find that this tax measure is closely correlated with the statutory tax rate. In this paper both variables are calculated.
[PLEASE insert Table 9 here]
In 
Bankruptcy measures
The theories about capital structure suggest among others as firm's bankruptcy measures the collateral value of assets, size, volatility of earnings and bankruptcy probability. However there are disagreements regarding basic facts. According to Harris and Ravid [1991] leverage increases with fixed assets and size and decreases with volatility of earnings and banrkuptcy probability. However Titman and Wessels [1988] do not find empircal evidence on debt ratios from collateral and volatility of earnings. In the sense to find which factors are reliably important Frank and Goyal [2005] analyse a vast number of factors. They found that seven from a set of 36 factors explain 32 percent of the variation in leverage. In fact for bankruptcy measures the important factors are the collateral value of assets and size. In this paper those two factors are used.
A firm with a high percentage of tangible assets in relation to total assets can support higher debt levels because these assets can be used as collateral for loans reducing the expected bankruptcy costs. This suggests a positive correlation between debt and fixed assets. This variable is calculated as tangible assets over total assets. Frank and Goyal [2005] find a positive relation among collateral and leverage.
Given that there are fixed costs associated with bankruptcy and large firms in general have lower probability for bankruptcy compared to small firms, it is expected that large firms have more debt in their capital structure than smaller firms. Titman and Wessels [1988] , Rajan and Zingales [1995] , Graham ([1996a] , [1998] ), Booth et al.
[2001], Giannetti [2003] and Frank and Goyal [2005] found positive statistical significant effect of firm's size on leverage. These studies have used the logharitm of total assets or sales to define the dimension of the firm. In this paper neither of this approaches as been used for the reason that the European Commission established as criterion for being a SME to have less than 250 employees. Therefore, the value of one is given to firms with less than 100 employees (small sized firms), value of two for firms between 100 and 250 employees (medium sized firms) and value of three to the ones with more than 250 (large sized firms). Marsh [1982] survey of the literature concludes that large firms more often choose long-term debt while small firms choose short-term debt. Is it expected a positive correlation among size and debt levels. The average tangible assets are 25.22 percent of total assets.
Agency/Asymmetric information measures
In this sub section several variables to model agency costs and asymmetric information are presented. Previous studies sugested as agency/asymmetric information variables such as: profitability, growth, intangible assets and firm's age.
The relationship between leverage and profitability of the firm is one of the main theoretical controversies. Myers and Majluf [1984] and Myers [1984] shows that asymmetric information result in a pecking order for external finance -firms prefer using internal sources of financing first, then debt and finally external equity obtained by stocks issues -and therefore a negative relationship among debt levels and profitability is expected. Firms with greater growth opportunities will have a greater potencial problem of underinvestment associated with debt financing, and therefore, a smaller debt level.
Thus agency theory suggests a negative relationship between debt and growth. To the extend that there is more asymmetric information for high growth firms then also predicts a negative relationship. This variable is defined as the change of the natural logarithm of total assets. Another alternative measure for asymmetric information is the amount of intangible assets. These assets are very opaque to external creditors and in general have a poor value as collateral for loans. Therefore, in the same line as the previous variable a negative correlation is expected between the amount of intangible assets and debt. Titman and Wessels [1988] and Gianneti [2003] have found a negative empirical relation between leverage and growth opportunities.
As time goes firms can retain more earnings and therefore increase their ability to finance new projects using internal generated funds. According to Petersen and Rajan [1994] leverage decreases with age as young firms are externally financed (mainly family sources) while old firms finance via retained earnings following a pecking order of borrowing over time. So, the need for new debt is lower as the firm gets older.
Another view can be made if firm's age is used as a proxy for the amount of available information about the firm. Given that for young firms there is very little available information it is difficult for them to obtain loans of any kind if the firm does not have a financial history. Therefore a positive relation between this variable and debt levels is expected. I calculate this variable as in Giannetti [2003] as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the date of incorporation of the firm.
[PLEASE insert Table 10 here]
In table 10 the summary statistics for the agency/asymmetric information variables are presented. The average amount for intangible assets is 2.25 percent of total assets. Earnings before interest and taxes are 7.72 percent of the total assets on average.
Firms have an average growth measured as the change in the natural logarithm of total assets of 8.97 percent. Regarding the number of years from the incorporation of the firm the average value is 22 years with a maximum of 318 years.
Ownership Structure measures
Amadeus database provides information regarding firm's ownership structure. If divided by small and large firms, the results are quite diferente. Despite in both cases the type "industrial company" be the most important (57.78% and 74.06%, respectively) it is more common to found a individual(s) or family(ies) ownership type in small firms (more of the double if compared with the large companies).
Three variables are contructed to capture the ownership effect on debt levels following the equation presented is section 3.1. In relation to the independence indicator the variable will assume the value of 1 if category A, 2 if B and 3 if C. Also a dummy variable is used to divide firms with Ultimate Owner of the one which do not have.
Finally a last dummy variable divide firms which the Ultimate Owner its a individual(s)
or family(ies) from all the other types.
Macroeconomic measures
Five variables are constructed to analyse the effect of macroeconomic factors on firm's financial decisions. The variables used are: Annual Inflation rate, short and long term interest rate (3 months risk free rate and 10-year benchmark bond interest rate, respectively), GDP growth and interest rate spread. Since nominal interest rates are closely related to inflation rates these variables capture the same effects and therefore only one should be used in the analysis. As an increase in nominal interest rates increases the cost of borrowing it is expected that for this reason firms will borrow less.
Therefore a negative relation among nominal interest rate /inflation rate with firm's debt level is expected.
A strong growth in the economy is a sign of healthy firms, more growth opportunities and an increase in the amount of debt in firm's capital structure.
Therefore a positive correlation between GDP growth and firm's debt levels is expected.
The interest rate spread is calculated as short term minus long term interes rate.
A decrease in the spread makes long-term financing relatively more expensive and so it is expected that firms will make more use of short-term finance and roll it over as required. Thus it is expected that the spread variable is positively related to long-term debt and negatively related to short-term debt. Table 12 provides some basic institutional information on macroeconomic variables.
[PLEASE insert Table 12 here]
On average the inflation rate during the years and across countries was of 3.17%.
During the same period short term interest was on average of smaller value than long term interest rate. The average nominal growth in GDP was of 5.15%.
[PLEASE insert Table 13 here] Table 13 describes the variables used in this study, broken down into five sets of characteristics: tax, bankruptcy, agency/asymmetric information, ownership and macroeconomic variables.
Results
Testing for a tax effect on leverage
In section 3 the basic test equation for the target adjustment model is presented as:
This equation is estimated using a pooled sample across firms and time periods This generates a total of 8 regressions reported in Table 14 
Bankruptcy measures
The measures for bankruptcy effects used are TANGIBLE and SIZE. Table 14 panel B shows that both variables are stongly significant and with the predicted relation with firm's debt level. As in previous studies a increase in the percentage of tangible assets in relation to total assets can support a higher debt level because these assets can be used as collateral for loans reducing the expected bakruptcy costs. Regarding the variable SIZE larger firms have lower bankruptcy costs and therefore the positive realation with firm's debt levels is verified. These results highlight the importance of the percentage of tangible assets and firm's size in capital structure as point out in Frank and Goyal [2005] who considered that these two factors are of the most important in capital structure decisions. By last it can be concluded that these factors are not only important when large listed firms are analysed, but also for SMEs and larger unlisted firms in a multi-country setting.
Agency/Asymmetric Information measures
The measures of Agency/Asymmetric Information used in this paper are all statistical significant, except to AGE which is significant only in 3 of the 8 regressions. From table   14 panel B the variable PROFIT is negative and statistical significant for one percent level in all the regressions. On average a one percent increase in firm's earnings before interest and taxes will result a 1.05 percent decrease in firm's debt level. That is a very important result given the relationship between leverage and profitability of the firm is one of the main theoretical controversies. This result is consistent with the Pecking Order arguments and is in line with previous studies examining SMEs (Chittenden et al [1996] and Michaelas et al [1999] ). Other studies with focus in large listed firms also find evidence of the Pecking Order. That is the case of Frank and Goyal [2005] who find that profits are a reliable factor for debt levels being its sign inconsistent with the trade-off theory. Their results point out that firms that have more profits tend to have less levarage. In Rajan and Zingales [1995] the pecking order theory is supported by a negative significant coefficient for USA, Japan and Canada but it is insignificant for the other countries.
The variable AGE is positive and statistical significant for 5 and 10 percent level in 3 of the regressions (in all the other regressions it is positive but not statistical significant). The argument so that the coefficient of this variable is positive can be that the youngest firms are usually small and as the time moves forward become larger. 8 If that is the case when firms get older and therefore larger more information is available being less difficult to them to obtain loans of any kind because they have a financial history.
Finally INTANGIBLE and GROWTH variables. Both variables are significant at one percent level with positive coefficients for all the regressions. Agency theory suggests a negative relationship between debt and growth. However a fast growing firm is often seen as a healthy firm with lower probability of bankruptcy and GROWTH variable is then expected to be positively correlated with debt levels. Therefore, it seems that this variable is picking up more the second effect than the first one which rejects the theory of underinvestment by Myers [1977] . 9 The variable INTANGIBLE also rejects the theory above being positive correlated with the GROWTH variable. Thus the agency-based measures from the balance sheet are not significant determinants of the capital structure of SMEs and larger unlisted fims. This lack of significance of the "agency variables" does not imply that agency and asymmetric information problems are not important. Only that it might not be possible to test for agency problems based on balance sheet data of unlisted firms because financial institutions solve these problems differently from financial markets.
10
8 That is confirmed by the correlation matrix which shows a positive relation between AGE and SIZE variables. 9 A strong conclusion can be obtained dividing the sample in two sub-samples: high growth firms vs. Low growth firms. 10 For a discussion see Bartholdy and Mateus [2005] .
Ownership Structure measures
To capture the ownership effect on firm's capital structure 3 variables are used and and defined previously ( Anderson and Reeb [2003] find that founding family ownership is related both statistically and economically to a lower cost of debt financing. Also they argue that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms but when family members serve as CEO, the cost of debt financing is higher relative to family firms with an outside CEO. Moreover, this higher cost is primarily attributable to founder descendents rather than founder CEOs. Therefore, financial institutions attribute a higher risk when the CEO position is from a family descendent. Given the sample used in this study is from unlisted firms and most of then SMEs (76% of total) with an average years of incorporation close to 25 years it is expected that in most of the firms the founder CEO is not any more in the position.
Usually, these firms try to find a CEO inside the family. The results shows that maybe the financial institutions grade worst firms in these conditions and therefore debt levels are lowest for family firms if compared with no family firms. A similar conclusion can be made assuming that family firms are more profitable. 11 If they are more profitable and given the consistent of the Pecking Order arguments for this sample family firms prefer using internal sources of financing first and only after that debt. Therefore a negative relation between FAMILY and firm's debt levels is expected and verified to this sample.
Macroeconomic measures
The three variables used to measure the macroeconomic effects in firm's debt levels have all the correct sign. INFLATION coefficient is negative and strongly statistical significant for one percent level for all the regressions. Regarding GDP growth is positive but not statistical significant. The coefficient of DIFFINTEREST variable can assume both a negative or positive value depending either short or long term debt is analysed. A decrease in the spread makes long-term financing relatively more expensive and so it is expected that firms will make more use of short-term finance and roll it over as required. That is the case for this sample and therefore the coefficient is positive and statistical significant for one percent level for all the regressions. A one percent increase in the spread will result a 1.2 percent increase in firm's debt level, on average. 
Countries, Law origin and Sectors
Robustness of the Results
As first robustness check the correlation matrix was calculated between the tax, bankruptcy, Agency/Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Macroeconomic variables. The results from Table 15 confirms that multicollinearity is not a problem in this sample. As expected high correlation among three of the tax variables (TXDUMMY,
DICHOTOMOUS and TRICHOTOMOUS).
From the correlation matrix one can highlight the negative correlation among SIZE and PROFIT (larger firms are less profitable) and positive between TANGIBLE and NDTS indicating that a higher proportion of tangible on total assets and consequently higher depreciation values will reduce the tax bill (no debt tax shields). Also as the firms become older (AGE) they are more profitable and have a lower growth rate. Finally when the Ultimate Owner is an individual or family, firm uses debt more conservatively (higher KINK) given conservatism and kink are positively related. Also family firms are more young and of smaller size.
As a final robustness check we apply the so-called "global sensitivity analysis" advocated by Leamer [1985] . To analyze whether the results may be driven by one country, year or industry I estimated the model for each tax variable dropping one of the countries at a time making a loop of 16 regressions. For each of these loops first one industry at a time was dropped and then all the observations from one year were dropped. The resulting average parameter estimates and t-statistics did not change (same coefficient sign and statistical significance).
12
The conclusion regarding the robustness of the tax effect is that the results reported in Table 14 (panels A and B) are robust to different estimation techniques and model specifications.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: First to test for an impact of the debt tax shield on the capital structure choice of SMEs and large non-listed firms and second to test whether the same factors determining the capital structure of large listed firms are also relevant for non-listed firms. The existing literature has primarily focused on testing various determinants of capital structure using listed firms that are large in their respective countries. The sources of capital differ between these two types of firms.
Large listed firms have access to domestic as well as international financial markets whereas small non-listed firms are primarily financed using owner provided equity and debt financing from financial institutions.
Considering these differences the question remains therefore whether the same factors are responsible for the capital structure choice in these two types of firms. First, I found that there is a significant debt tax shield impact on the capital structure choice for small non-listed firms. Second, I found that the traditional variables used to model bankruptcy risk (collateral), agency problems and ownership structure were generally significant for unlisted firms. Third, I found that institutional factors such as country legal system have an important impact on the capital structure for both SMEs and large unlisted firms. 
